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HEN we review the past year's criminal cases, we find no re-
markable departures from prior Texas and Federal law as to
confessions, searches, and seizures. Harmless error analysis is
still routinely applied, and both state and federal appellate courts give
credence to trial court fact-findings unless they are clearly erroneous.
I. CONFESSIONS
A. VOLUNTARINESS
Courts determine a confession's voluntariness by considering the total-
ity of the circumstances.1 They review trial court decisions as to admissi-
bility under an abuse of discretion standard and will not disturb them as
long as the rulings are within the zone of reasonable disagreement. And
if the ruling is correct under any applicable theory of law, it will be sus-
tained, even if the trial court gives the wrong reason for its ruling.2
A statement is involuntary if the record shows such official, coercive
conduct that any resulting statement is unlikely to have been a free and
* Judge, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
1. Jeffley v. State, 38 S.W.3d 847, 860 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet.
ref'd).
2. Reed v. State, 59 S.W.3d 278, 280-81 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. filed).
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unconstrained choice by its maker. 3 But "trickery or deception does not
make a statement involuntary unless the method was calculated to pro-
duce an untruthful confession or was offensive to due process."
4
On the other hand, where the facts surrounding multiple confessions
showed that they had been coerced by threats, intimidation, and manipu-
lation of the suspect's fragile mental state over several days, the state-
ments were involuntary. 5
B. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
In determining whether a person is in custody, the court will again con-
sider the totality of the circumstances.6 The following situations generally
constitute custody:
* when a suspect is physically deprived of freedom of action in any
significant way;
* when a law enforcement officer tells a suspect that he or she cannot
leave;
* when a law enforcement officer creates a situation that would lead a
reasonable person to believe that his or her freedom of movement
has been substantially restricted; or
* when there is probable cause to arrest, and a law enforcement officer
does not tell the suspect that he or she is free to leave.
In the first three situations, the restriction on freedom of movement
must rise to the degree associated with an arrest and not just an investiga-
tive detention. And in the fourth situation, the officer must manifest
knowledge of probable cause to the suspect.7
The Miranda warnings as codified in Texas Code of Criminal Proce-
dure Article 38.22 apply only to statements made during custodial inter-
rogation. If an investigation is not at an accusatorial or custodial stage, a
person's Fifth Amendment rights have not yet come into play, and the
voluntariness of those rights is not implicated.
For example, when a person was allowed to move about freely at the
police station, allowed to walk unescorted to the restroom in the foyer,
allowed to call his parents and pastor and speak to them privately, and
was told repeatedly that he was not under arrest and was free to leave, his
confession was voluntary and non-custodial.8 In another case, a juvenile's
statements to juvenile probation officers while in custody were held not
to be the result of "interrogation."9
3. Jeffley, 38 S.W.3d at 860.
4. Id.
5. Soffar v. Johnson, 237 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2000) reh'g granted, 253 F.3d 227 (5th Cir.
2001).
6. Jeffley, 38 S.W.3d at 860.
7. Id. at 855.
8. Sander v. State, 52 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001, pet. ref'd).
9. Rushing v. State, 50 S.W.3d 715, 729-32 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet. ref'd).
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Of course, the warning requirements of Miranda do come into play
when the suspect is in custody. And in order to waive a Miranda right, a
suspect must do so unambiguously.10 Nevertheless, if there is additional
overwhelming evidence of guilt, the admission of a confession in violation
of Miranda can be harmless error.1
If there is a pretrial hearing and a defendant wishes to challenge a con-
fession's admissibility, he or she had better do so at that time. In Ramirez
v. State,'2 a defendant failed to present any evidence during a pretrial
hearing on admissibility that he had invoked his right to remain silent
before the statement was taken. Although he later testified at trial that
he had invoked the right, the Austin court held that the later testimony
did not affect the statement's admissibility as determined in the pretrial
hearing.13
As to privileged communications, the only privilege that applies in
child abuse or neglect cases is the attorney-client privilege. Thus, confes-
sions to a church elder 14 and a pastor 15 were ruled admissible and not
privileged.
Generally, when an adult suspect confesses in another state to a Texas
crime, Texas courts will look to see if the out-of-state officers substan-
tially complied with the required warnings. a6
C. JUVENILES
We had more published juvenile cases this year than usual. Texas
courts continue to look very closely at juvenile confessions and insist that
they be obtained in strict adherence to the relevant Family Code provi-
sions. Of course, the Code's provisions generally do not apply to
juveniles' non-custodial statements.' 7 But the Austin Court of Appeals
held that since a juvenile's first confession was improperly obtained, sub-
sequent non-custodial statements made to police officers modifying the
earlier statement were also inadmissible.' 8
The Court of Criminal Appeals held that because a juvenile's oral
statements were not the result of custodial interrogation and were made
on the way to a juvenile processing office, the trial court properly admit-
ted them. But because the juvenile was not first taken to the processing
office before the police acted upon those statements, the court erred in
admitting evidence concerning recovery of the stolen property de-
10. Saldana v. State, 59 S.W.3d 703, 711 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. filed).
11. U.S. v. Virgen-Moreno, 265 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 843
(2002) (mem.).
12. Ramirez v. State, 44 S.W.3d 107 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no pet. h.).
13. Id.
14. Bordman v. State, 56 S.W.3d 63 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd).
15. Gonzales v. State, 45 S.W.3d 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
16. Norn v. State, 41 S.W.3d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Buckley v. State, 46 S.W.3d
333 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd).
17. In re E.M.R., 55 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet. h.).
18. In re R.J.H., 28 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet. h.).
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scribed. 19 In another case, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a
forty-five to fifty minute delay in taking a juvenile to the designated juve-
nile office was a reasonable delay for officers to secure a crime scene and
attempt to save a victim's life. The subsequently obtained written state-
ment was therefore admissible.20
With regard to parental notification as to a child's being in custody, the
intermediate courts of appeals have demanded strict compliance. For ex-
ample, Odessa police notified a suspect's mother that he had been taken
into custody as a juvenile absconder. They did not, however, tell her that
they suspected him of committing a murder. They also did not tell her
the reason they were taking him to the police station the next morning
until she called back to determine her son's status. The confession taken
from the defendant at a juvenile detention facility after he was duly
warned of his rights was held to be improperly admitted by the trial
court.2 1 The courts have also held that parental notification must be
prompt, or any statement taken will be inadmissible. 22
According to one court opinion, the Family Code protection even fol-
lows juveniles to other states. A juvenile was arrested in Chicago on a
Texas arrest warrant for murder. She gave a written confession to Chi-
cago police officers. The Corpus Christi court held that the juvenile was
entitled to all procedural protections that Texas law provided. Since the
Chicago police did not follow Texas law, the court held the confession to
be inadmissible. The Court of Criminal Appeals has granted review of
this issue.23
Although the Family Code does not require magistrates to advise
juveniles of the adult range of punishment applicable to the offense
charged, if a magistrate does so, he or she had better be right. The San
Antonio court said that a magistrate's well-intentioned but erroneous vol-
unteering of such information rendered the juvenile's subsequent confes-
sion involuntary. In this case, the magistrate advised him that the
maximum sentence was one year in jail, rather than ninety-nine years or
life in the penitentiary.24
Finally, an assistant principal's questioning of a juvenile suspect was
held not to be custodial interrogation. The assistant principal was not a
law enforcement officer, so the juvenile was not in official custody and
did not have the right to remain silent or speak to a lawyer. Therefore,
the statement given to the assistant principal was admissible.25
19. Roquemore v. State, 60 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
20. Contreras v. State, No. 1682-99, 2001 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 58 (Tex. Crim. App.
June 27, 2001).
21. Hampton v. State, 36 S.W.3d 921 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, pet. filed).
22. See State v. Simpson, 51 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2001, pet. filed); Pham v.
State, 36 S.W.3d 199 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.); Hill v. State, No. 12-
00-00172-CR, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 3050 (Tex. App.-Tyler May 9, 2001, no pet. h.).
23. Vega v. State, 32 S.W.3d 897 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. granted).
24. Diaz v. State, 61 S.W.3d 525 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. dism'd).
25. In re V.P., 55 S.W.3d 25 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. denied).
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D. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT To COUNSEL
It is well established that once a suspect has an attorney, any interroga-
tion without first notifying the attorney is unlawful, and any statement
obtained as a result of the interrogation is excludable. The Supreme
Court in reversing the Court of Criminal Appeals decision, held that be-
cause the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is "offense specific," it does
not necessarily extend to offenses that are "factually related" to those
that have actually been charged. 26
E. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
In other Texas cases decided this year, courts have resolved the follow-
ing issues:
" In a suppression hearing, a defendant cannot be compelled to give
up his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination in or-
der to assert his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasona-
ble searches and seizures. 27
" A defendant cannot successfully challenge a confession's admissibil-
ity under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. 28
" When a defendant in custody initiated a meeting with a therapist and
counselor and made an inculpatory statement to him, the statement
was admissible. Since he initiated the meeting, he was not entitled to
be advised of his right to remain silent under Estelle v. Smith.29 Fur-
thermore, there was no applicable patient-physician privilege.30
II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. IN GENERAL
Texas courts continue to follow the U.S. Supreme Court's lead in
search and seizure cases. Virtually all the Texas cases in this area are
primarily analyzed in light of the Fourth Amendment, rather than the
Texas Constitution.
This year, the courts reminded us yet again that the Fourth Amend-
ment does not forbid all searches and seizures-only unreasonable
ones,31 and that one complaining of a search must have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.32
The Austin Court of Appeals reiterated that the reasonableness inquiry
under the Fourth Amendment is an objective one, wholly divorced from
26. Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001).
27. Crosson v. State, 36 S.W.3d 642, 645 (Tex App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet.
ref'd).
28. U.S. v. Jiminez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 2620
(2001).
29. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
30. Ruckman v. State, No. 12-99-00388-CR, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 8708, at *17-18
(Tex. App.-Tyler Nov. 29, 2000, no pet. h.).
31. King v. State, 35 S.W.3d 740 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
32. Carroll v. State, 56 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet. ref'd).
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police officers' subjective beliefs. It involves an objective assessment of
the officer's actions under the circumstances and not the officer's actual
state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken. 33
As to the standard of review on motions to suppress alleging illegally
obtained evidence, the reviewing court gives almost total deference to the
trial court's determination of historical facts and reviews de novo the
court's application of search and seizure law.34 And apparently, if trial
judges fail to explain inexplicable rulings, do so incomprehensibly, or do
so erroneously, the appellate courts will, nevertheless, toil mightily to jus-
tify them-if the judge suppresses the confession. 35 On the other hand,
where the judge denied a defendant's motion to suppress, the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals gave the judge's decision no such deference. 36
B. ARREST, STOP, OR INQUIRY WITHOUT WARRANT
As to traffic stops, an officer's observation of a traffic violation is suffi-
cient authority for an officer to stop the vehicle and to arrest the driver.
And when a police officer lawfully arrests an occupant of an automobile,
the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of the arrest, search that
individual. Furthermore, a private citizen may arrest a traffic violator if
the citizen observes the violation and the violation is egregious enough to
constitute a breach of the peace. Consequently, when an arrest of a traf-
fic offender by an off-duty United States Customs agent was lawful under
Texas law, and when the cocaine seized from the vehicle's truck bed was
incident to the arrest, the cocaine was admissible against the driver.37
Once the purpose for which a traffic stop is made has been accom-
plished, further detention is unlawful. Thus, further prolonged detention
and questioning after police had issued a motorist a warning citation for
speeding, absent articulable suspicion for the further detention, was ruled
a Fourth Amendment violation. 38
On the other hand, an officer is justified in conducting a pat-down
search for weapons during a traffic stop, and if illegal drugs are discov-
ered during such a protective search, they are admissible. 39 And when an
officer smelled marihuana on a motorcyclist during the course of a traffic
stop, the subsequent search of his person and seizure of the contraband
was proper.40 Of course, any illegal substance abandoned by the driver
33. State v. Nash, 55 S.W.3d 110 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no pet.). See also U.S. v.
Sealed Juvenile 1, 255 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2001).
34. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
35. See id. at 859-60 (Womack, J., concurring); Nash, 55 S.W.3d at 110; State v. Boone,
45 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet ref'd).
36. Reyes-Perez v. State, 45 S.W.3d 312 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. ref'd).
37. Sealed Juvenile 1, 255 F.3d at 213.
38. U.S. v. Jones, 234 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 2000); see also U.S. v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395
(5th Cir. 2001); McQuarters v. State, 58 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet.
filed); State v. Daly, 35 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.).
39. Farmer v. State, 47 S.W.3d 187 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd).
40. Burkhalter v. State, 38 S.W.3d 177 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet. h.).
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or a passenger or in plain view during the stop is subject to seizure.41
An "investigative detention," or "stop," is a brief detention of a person
reasonably suspected of criminal activity to determine his identity, or to
maintain the status quo momentarily, while obtaining more information.
It is distinguished from an "arrest" which occurs when a person's liberty
of movement is restricted or restrained. An officer must have articulable
suspicion to make a stop-less than probable cause 42-since a stop is less
intrusive than an arrest.
In determining the existence of articulable suspicion, courts look at the
totality of the circumstances. Thus, an officer was justified in stopping
and frisking a suspect whom he saw sprinting away from a grocery store
in a high crime area, furtively glancing over his shoulder.43 And an of-
ficer who saw a large "bong," or marihuana pipe in plain view through an
open apartment door was justified in detaining and investigating the re-
sidents. He was further entitled to enter the apartment and arrest one of
the residents without a warrant when his co-resident tried to flee and
conceal the bong.44
Of course, if an officer is in a place where he or she has a right to be,
any suspicious object in plain view is subject to seizure. So where an
officer reasonably approached an apartment to investigate complaints of
criminal activity, stood before an open door, and saw a handgun resting
on the kitchen table, exigent circumstances existed for his entry into the
apartment and his seizure of the weapon.45 In another case, an officer
visited a defendant at his motel room to investigate the harboring of a
runaway child. The defendant allowed him to enter, and the officer saw
an upside-down picture that looked like a young child in a sexual pose.
On closer inspection, the officer's suspicion was confirmed, he seized the
picture, and arrested the defendant for possession of child pornography.
The Fifth Circuit panel held that an officer does not have to be sure that
an item in plain view is incriminating before seizing it. The officer just
needs to have probable cause to believe that the item is associated with
criminal activity.46
On the other hand, a valid consensual encounter with police need not
be supported by probable cause or even articulable suspicion. The test
for determining whether an encounter with police qualifies as a valid con-
sensual encounter is that set out in Florida v. Bostick.47 "The issue in
determining whether an encounter occurred is whether the police con-
duct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person
41. King, 35 S.W.3d at 740; Sargent v. State, 56 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2000, pet. filed); Ste-Marie v. State, 32 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2000, no pet.).
42. Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
43. U.S. v. Jordan, 232 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2000).
44. Waugh v. State, 51 S.W.3d 714 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, no pet. h.).
45. U.S. v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 142 (2001).
46. U.S. v. Simmonds, 262 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 851 (2002).
47. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
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was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter.
'48
C. AFFIDAVITS SUPPORTING SEARCH WARRANTS
Whether the facts alleged in a probable cause affidavit sufficiently sup-
port a search warrant is determined by examining the totality of the cir-
cumstances. Probable cause exists when the facts submitted to the
magistrate will justify a conclusion that the object of the search is proba-
bly on the described premises at the time the warrant is issued.49 Only
the facts contained in the affidavit may be considered, but the magistrate
may draw reasonable inferences from them and must interpret the affida-
vit in a common sense manner.50
The Fourth Amendment incorporates the common law requirement
that officers entering a home must knock on the door, identify themselves
as police officers, and announce their purpose before entry. This require-
ment protects the officers and occupants from potential violence, pre-
vents the unnecessary destruction of private property, and protects
people from unnecessary intrusion into their private activities. This rule,
however, is flexible and does not ignore overriding law enforcement in-
terests. "Courts must decide whether an unannounced entry is reasona-
ble under all the circumstances of the case and in light of law
enforcement's actions as a whole.151
To justify a no-knock entry, the police must reasonably suspect that
knocking and announcing their presence would be dangerous and futile,
or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of a crime by, for exam-
ple, allowing the destruction of evidence.52
One Texas court-the Eastland Court of Appeals-has held that the
smell of burning marihuana will not provide probable cause for an officer
to obtain a search warrant.53 This issue is now before the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals.
D. SEARCHES WITHOUT WARRANTS
Warrantless searches are unreasonable per se unless they qualify as one
of the court-created exceptions to the general rule that a search must be
conducted pursuant to a warrant. And the State has the burden to show
that a search comes within an exception. Usually, it is not very difficult to
do so.
48. Citizen v. State, 39 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet. h.);
see also Roy v. State, 55 S.W.3d 153 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet. h.).
49. Id. at 654.
50. Robuck v. State, 40 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. ref'd).
51. U.S. v. Cantu, 230 F.3d 148, 152 (5th Cir. 2000).
52. Id.
53. State v. Steelman, 16 S.W.3d 483, 490 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2000, pet. granted);
Radford v. State, 56 S.W.3d 346 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, pet. filed).
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However, when the police presented no evidence that the defendant
was armed and dangerous, it was unreasonable for an officer to enter his
motel room and seize illegal drugs without a warrant or consent. The fact
that the defendant made a furtive gesture and threw something behind a
door was insufficient justification to enter and search. "The State
presented no evidence the officer entered the motel room either (1) to
render aid or assistance to someone he reasonably believed was in need
of assistance, (2) to prevent the destruction of evidence or contraband,"
(3) to protect himself from the defendant, or (4) to prevent the defen-
dant's escape. 54
Of course, the search of a person incident to a lawful arrest is excepted
from the requirement of obtaining a warrant. And recently, the Texar-
kana Court of Appeals held that subjecting a defendant to a gastric lav-
age was reasonable when the arrestee had white powder in his mouth,
police had transported him to a hospital, and a gram of cocaine was re-
covered from the arrestee's stomach by accepted medical procedures to
save his life.55
E. CONSENT To SEARCH
"Consent to search is one of the well-established exceptions to the con-
stitutional requirements of either a warrant or probable cause. '56 The
''consent to search must be positive and unequivocal and must not be the
product of duress or coercion, either express or implied. ' 57 Voluntary
consent is not by mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.
"Whether consent was given voluntarily is a question of fact to be deter-
mined from the totality of the circumstances. '58 The State has the bur-
den of showing consent by clear and convincing evidence. 59 "A search is
valid if, in light of all the circumstances, the officers' belief that they had
consent to search was objectively reasonable. ' 60 And "the fact that ap-
pellant was in custody does not, without more, render his consent to
search involuntary. "61
It is well established that a "police officer may approach a citizen with-
out probable cause or reasonable suspicion to even request a search."'62
There is, however, peculiar language in a Fourteenth Court of Appeals
54. Newhouse v. State, 53 S.W.3d 765, 770 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no
pet. h.).
55. Lewis v. State, 56 S.W.3d 617 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet. h.).
56. Griffin v. State, 54 S.W.3d 820, 823 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd).
57. Heincelman v. State, 56 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, no pet. h.);
Estrada v. State, 30 S.W.3d 599, 603-04 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet ref'd).
58. Id.
59. Estrada, 30 S.W.3d at 604.
60. Morris v. State, 50 S.W.3d 89, 99 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet. h.).
61. Manzi v. State, 56 S.W.3d 710, 716 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet.
granted).
62. Leach v. State, 35 S.W.3d 232, 235 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.).
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decision about reasonable suspicion to ask for consent to search. 63 It
does not represent prevailing law.
As to authority to consent, officers must not always accept at face value
the consenting party's assumption or claim of authority to allow the con-
templated search. They cannot lawfully proceed without inquiry into am-
biguous circumstances. 64
The standard of admissibility is significantly higher when consent is ob-
tained after an unlawful search or seizure. To evaluate consent given af-
ter a Fourth Amendment violation, the Fifth Circuit panel conducted a
two-pronged inquiry:
1) whether the consent was voluntarily given; and
2) whether the consent was an independent act of free will. 65
The first prong concerns coercion; the second concerns causal connection
with the constitutional violation.66
The Fifth Circuit panel applied a six-factor test to determine whether
the subsequent consent to search was voluntary. It considered the follow-
ing factors:
1) the voluntariness of a defendant's custodial status;
2) the presence of coercive police procedures;
3) the extent and level of the defendant's cooperation with the police;
4) the defendant's awareness of his right to refuse consent;
5) the defendant's education and intelligence; and
6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be
found.67
The Court then considered whether the consent to search given was an
independent act of free will. It considered the following factors:
1) the temporal proximity of the illegal conduct and the consent;
2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and
3) the purpose and flagrancy of the initial misconduct.68
F. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
In other cases decided this year, courts have decided the following
issues:
* Where the statute authorized the involuntary taking of blood if "(1)
there was a life-threatening accident; (2) the defendant was arrested
for an intoxication offense under Chapter 49" (of the Penal Code),
63. Simpson v. State, 29 S.W.3d 324, 328 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet.
ref'd).
64. Corea v. State, 52 S.W.3d 311, 317 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet.
ref'd).
65. Jones, 234 F.3d at 242.
66. Id.
67. Jones, 234 F.3d at 242.
68. Id. at 243.
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and (3) the arresting officer reasonably believed that the accident
occurred as a result of the offense, a sharply divided Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals held that the officer was required to have an indepen-
dent reasonable belief that the accident occurred as a result of the
offense, based on specific and articulable facts of causation aside
from the accident and the arrest.69
" Courts reaffirmed the police community caretaking function. "[A]
police officer may stop and assist an individual who a reasonable per-
son, given the totality of the circumstances, would believe is in need
of help." 70 There are four nonexclusive, nonexhaustive factors in de-
termining the reasonableness of such a stop:
(1) the nature and level of the distress exhibited by the individual;
(2) the location of the individual; (3) whether or not the individual
was alone and/or had access to assistance independent of that of-
fered by the officer; and (4) to what extent the individual, if not as-
sisted, presented a danger to himself or others.71
* Where a state hospital implemented a policy setting forth procedures
to identify pregnant patients suspected of drug abuse, testing sus-
pected patients for drugs, and reporting positive tests to the police,
the Supreme Court of the United States held the Fourth Amend-
ment's prohibition of nonconsensual, warrantless, and suspicionless
searches applied to the policy. The closely guarded category of "spe-
cial needs" did not apply.
III. CONCLUSION
Our overview of this year's confession, search, and seizure decisions
reveals significant but predictable clarifications of well-established law, as
well as a few issues that should be resolved during the next term of court.
We see that Texas courts will continue to afford the accused the same
protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution and that those
protections are only increased where Texas' statutory laws require it.
69. Badgett v. State, 42 S.W.3d 136, 138-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
70. Lebron v. State, 35 S.W.3d 774 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd); Morfin v.
State, 34 S.W.3d 664 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.).
71. Id. at 777.
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